Proof systems for verifiable computation (VC) have the potential to make cloud outsourcing more trustworthy. Recent schemes enable a verifier with limited resources to delegate large computations and verify their outcome based on succinct arguments: verification complexity is linear in the size of the inputs and outputs (not the size of the computation). However, cloud computing also often involves large amounts of data, which may exceed the local storage and I/O capabilities of the verifier, and thus limit the use of VC.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic proof systems let a verifier check that the computation executed by an untrusted prover was performed correctly [28] . These systems are appealing in a variety of scenarios, such as cloud computing, where a user outsources computations and wishes to verify their integrity given their inputs and outputs (I/O) [2, 36, 27, 25] , or privacy-preserving applications, where a user owns sensitive data and wishes to release partial information with both confidentiality and integrity guarantees [42, 24] . Typically, these systems require the prover to perform considerable additional work to produce a proof that can be easily checked by the verifier.
Recent advances in verifiable computations have crossed an important practical threshold: verifying a proof given some I/O is faster than performing the computation locally [40, 7, 43, 45] . While these systems perform well when delegating computation-intensive algorithms, they do not help much with data-intensive applications, inasmuch as verification remains linear in the application's I/O.
Although some linear work is unavoidable when uploading data, ideally one would like to pay this price just once, rather than every time one verifies a computation that takes this data as input. This is particularly relevant for cloud computing on big data, where the verifier may not have enough local resources to encode and upload the whole database each time she delegates a query or, more generally, where many parties contribute data over a long period of time.
Approaches providing amortized verification do exist for limited classes of computations, such as data retrieval. For instance, the user may keep the root of a Merkle hash tree, and use it to verify the retrieved content. Unfortunately, as explained below, embeddings of this approach into generic proof systems incur large overheads for the prover.
Our goal is to enable practical verifiable computation for data-intensive applications. In particular, we wish to design schemes where verification time is independent of both the size of the delegated computations and the size of their I/O. Moreover, we wish to preserve the expressiveness of existing VC schemes (e.g., supporting NP relations) without adding to the prover's burden, which is already several orders of magnitude higher than the original computation.
Modelling Hash & Prove (HP)
We first propose a model that captures the idea of hashing and uploading data once and then using the resulting hashes across multiple verifiable computations. In this model, the verifier needs only keep track of hashes, while the prover stores the cor-responding data. The prover can use the data to perform computations and then (selectively) return results in plaintext to the verifier. As described below, hashes yield several benefits when delegating verifiable computations.
Flexible Reuse Hashes depend only on the data and are not tied to any particular computation. Hence, once a data hash is computed, it can be used to verify any computation that uses the corresponding data. It can also be used with different proof systems, as long as they rely on the same hash format. Sharing Hashes are a compact representation of the data that can be easily shared and authenticated. Hence, verifiers can delegate computations on someone else's hashes, or chain multiple computations using intermediate hashes, without ever seeing or receiving the corresponding data. Provenance A record of an input hash, an output hash, and a proof can serve as a succinct provenance token that can be easily and independently verified. Confidentiality The verifier checks arguments on hashes of data that she may never see in plaintext; hence randomized hashes enable zero-knowledge arguments. Updates If the hash mechanism also supports efficient updates, that is, given hash(x), one can compute hash(x ) in time that depends only on the difference between x and x , then it also enables applications with dynamic data and streaming. For instance, a hashed database may be updated by uploading the new data and locally updating the hash.
Our hash & prove model extends non-interactive proof systems, with an intermediate hash algorithm between the input and the proof verification, and with the possibility of proving multiple relations. It is inspired by multi-function verifiable computation [41, 23] , with relations instead of functions so that we can capture more general use cases, notably those where the prover provides its own (private) input to the computation.
Instantiating Hash & Prove Now equipped with a model for outsourcing multiple computations on authenticated data, we survey how existing work could be used to instantiate HP schemes. In particular, we observe that existing solutions have limitations either in efficiency or in generality. Some prior work [11, 26, 5, 15] considers the idea of proving the correctness of a computation on data succinctly represented by a hash. This approach consists of encoding the verification of the hash as part of a relation for the underlying proof system. Namely, if y = f (x) is the statement to be proved, then one actually proves an extended statement of the form y = f (x) ∧ σ = hash(x), essentially treating x as an additional witness. We henceforth refer to this method as an inner encoding. Inner encodings are simple and general, and can also be extended to more general data encodings such as Merkle trees or authenticated data structures (ADS) [44, 21] . On the other hand, inner encodings incur a significant overhead for the prover-indeed, unless hash is carefully tuned to the proof system, its verifiable evaluation on large inputs may dominate the prover costs.
Other works address reusability and succinct data representation by using different data encoding approaches that we will call outer encodings. The basic idea of outer encodings is that proofs are produced for the original statement, e.g., y = f (x), and are linked to the encoded data x using some external mechanism. Works that can be explained under this approach are commit & prove schemes [33, 16, 19] and homomorphic authenticators [4, 17, 29] . While we discuss them in detail in §7, the main observation is that all these works fall short in generality; i.e., they limit the class of computations that can be executed on an hash value. While commit & prove schemes can achieve greater generality by using universal relations (as, e.g., in [5, 7, 9] ), this typically entails a significant penalty in concrete efficiency.
New Hash & Prove Constructions Our main technical contributions are efficient, general HP constructions. Compared to general inner encoding solutions, ours incurs minimal overheads for the prover. Compared to prior outer encoding solutions, ours is fully general, in the sense that one can hash data first, without any restriction on the functions that may later be executed and verified on it.
We instantiate multi-relation hash & prove schemes both in the public and designated verifier settings. Our solutions are built in a semi-generic fashion by combining (1) a verifiable computation (VC) or succinct non interactive argument (SNARG) scheme, and (2) an HP scheme for simple, specific computations.
At a high level, our construction uses an outer data encoding, where general computation integrity is handled by (1), whereas data authentication and linking to the computation is handled by (2) . As expected from an outer approach, this combination does not add any overhead in the use of (1), and the overhead introduced by (2) can be very low. More specifically, for (1) we use any scheme where the input-processing part of the verification consists of a multiexponentiation, that is, anything resembling a Pedersen commitment of the form cx = i Fi x i , a property of virtually all modern, efficient SNARGs [40, 7, 19, 9, 31] . Our generic construction then outsources to the prover the original computation of (1) as well as the input-processing part of SNARG verification, cx = i Fi x i . We then ask the prover to show the correctness of cx using the auxiliary HP scheme (2) . To this end, we only need a scheme that handles multiexponentiation computations. We propose our own efficient constructions for such HP schemes. For the designated verifier setting, we adapt a multi-function VC scheme from prior work [23] . For public verifiability, we develop a new scheme, which requires new techniques to achieve adaptive security.
Our analysis in §6 shows that, in comparison to the inner encoding solution mentioned earlier, our HP scheme yields a 1, 400× speed-up for provers, as well as public (proving) keys that are shorter by the same factor.
Speeding up Hashing and Verification As mentioned above, VC schemes involve a verification effort linear in the size of the I/O. Concretely, this verification step is expensive because it relies on public-key operations (e.g., a few ellipticcurve multiplications for each word of I/O). With Hash & Prove, this linear work is first shifted to computing the hash, and then amortized across multiple computations, but the hash still has to be computed once.
When using inner encodings, one can choose standard, very efficient hash functions such as SHA2, which considerably reduces the effort of the verifier, at the expenses of the prover. Other trade-offs between verifier and prover costs are possible, e.g., by using algebraic hash constructions [1, 8, 15] . When using outer encodings, the choice of a hash function is more constrained. For instance, in Geppetto or in our HP scheme, the encoding still consists of a multiexponentiation (i.e., n elliptic-curve multiplications where n is the size of the input).
As another contribution, we provide a technique to outsource such (relatively) expensive data encodings, at a moderate additional cost for the prover, while requiring only a trivial amount of linear work from the verifier: an arbitrary (fast) hash such as SHA2, and a few cheap field additions and multiplications, instead of elliptic curve operations. Concretely, this technique saves two orders of magnitude in verification time. It applies not only to our HP scheme, but also to existing VC systems [40, 19, 9] .
Other Data Encodings In our presentation, we focus on plain hashes as a simple data encoding for all I/O, but many alternatives and variations are possible, depending on the needs of a given application. As a first example, the I/O can naturally be partitioned into several variables, each independently hashed and verified, to separate inputs from different parties, or with different live spans. (In a dataintensive application, for instance, one may use a hash for the whole database, and a separate hash for the query and its response.) More advanced examples include authenticated data structures, and more specific tools such as accumulators. To illustrate potential extensions of our work, we show that the HP model, and our generic HP construction, can be extended to work with such outer encodings. Concretely, we consider accumulators [37] and polynomial commitments [32] , with set operations [38] and batch openings as restricted proof systems, respectively. By adapting our constructions, we obtain a new accumulate & prove system.
Contents
The paper is organized as follows: §2 defines our notations, reviews assumptions we rely on, and recalls definitions of succinct non-interactive argument systems. §3 defines our hash & prove model, shows that some of the existing work satisfies it, and discusses their overhead for the prover. §4 presents our efficient HP construction and instantiates it for public and designated verifier settings. §5 presents the definition and construction of a hash & prove variant that supports hash outsourcing. §6 analyze the performance of our constructions. §7 discusses related work.
The full version [22] also includes auxiliary definitions, detailed proofs, and an extension of our work from hashes to cryptographic accumulators.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. Given two functions f, g :
. In other words, for all k, there exists an integer n0 such that for all λ > n0, we have |f (λ) − g(λ)| < 1 λ k . We say that f is negligible when f (λ) ≈ 0.
Algebraic Tools and Complexity Assumptions. All our constructions make use of asymmetric bilinear primeorder groups G λ = (e, G1, G2, GT , p, g1, g2) with an admissible bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT . We use fixed groups for every value of the security parameter; this lets us compose schemes that use them without requiring a joint setup algorithm. Even when pairings are not required, we define schemes for group G1 and generator g1 to anticipate their usage in later constructions. Our constructions are proven secure under the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Strong External Diffie-Hellman [39] and has to decide if
= e(h, C) holds. Hence A succeeds in solving the DDH instance with A's success probability.
For extractability, we optionally require the following assumption parameterized by hash size n:
Assumption 3 (Bilinear n-Knowledge of Exponent). The Bilinear n-Knowledge of Exponent assumption holds if, for every p.p.t. adversary A, there exists a p.p.t. extractor E such that for all large enough λ and 'benign' auxiliary input aux ∈ {0, 1}
In the game above, (u; w) ← (A E) indicates running both algorithms on the same inputs and random tape, and assigning their results to u and to w, respectively. This assumption can been seen as an n-Knowledge of Exponent Assumption [11] but for the general group model. Indeed the authors of [11] use the argument by Groth [30] to conjecture that their assumption must hold independently of the bilinear structure. Auxiliary input is required to be drawn from a 'benign distribution' to avoid impossibility of certain knowledge assumptions [12, 10] .
Online-Offline SNARKs
We recall the definition of succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARG) and arguments of knowledge (SNARK) as used by our constructions.
Let {R λ } λ be a sequence of families of efficiently decidable relations R ∈ R λ , with R ⊂ UR × WR. For pairs (u ; w) ∈ R, we call u the instance and w the witness; we are interested in producing and verifying arguments that ∃w.R(u ; w) holds. We require that all instances include some data in a fixed format. That is, for each R ∈ R λ , we have UR = X × VR and instances are of the form u = (x, v). For example, u may consist of the input x and output y of a function with domain X, i.e., y = f (x). More generally, u may consist of the inputs x, y and output z of functions whose domains include X, i.e., z = f (x, y).
For any sequence of families of efficiently decidable relations {R λ } λ as defined above, SNARGs and SNARKs consist of 3 algorithms VC = (KeyGen, Prove, Verify), as follows.
(EK, VK) ← KeyGen(1 λ , R) takes the security parameter and a relation R ∈ R λ and computes evaluation and verification keys.
Π ← Prove(EK, u ; w) takes an evaluation key for R, an instance u, and a witness w such that R(u ; w) holds, and returns a proof.
b ← Verify(VK, u, Π) takes a verification key and an instance u, and either accepts (b = 1) or rejects (b = 0) the proof Π.
(EK, VK) are also referred to as the common reference string. 
Online-Offline Verification
1 The verification algorithm of many SNARG constructions can be split into offline and online computations. Specifically, for many SNARGs, there exists algorithms (Online, Offline) such that:
The offline phase can be seen as the computation of one or more Pedersen-like commitments cx (here, cx = Offline(VK, x)), some of which may be computed by the prover, and possibly never opened by the verifier. On their own, such commitments are not perfectly binding, so this involves modelling adversaries that do not output (u, w) but still must 'know' the value they are committing to. For such cases, we require the existence of an algorithm E that can extract x and w from a verifying proof. 
Instantiations of Online-Offline SNARKs Many succinct verifiable-computation constructions [20, 7, 9, 31] can be presented in a style that make more apparent their reliance on commitments on their inputs, outputs, and internal witnesses. We may instantiate VC using, for example, the Geppetto construction [19] , which explicitly separates (offline) commitments and (online) proofs and provides online knowledge soundness. 1 The offline phase is not to be confused with inputindependent precomputation steps of the verifier in [8, 9] .
Instantiation of Offline Verification In our work, we consider schemes where the offline computations consist purely of multi-exponentiations in G1 over the instance u, followed by online computations that accept or reject the proof. As mentioned above, we consider the case when UR splits into X, VR. More specifically, we assume that X = Z n p and Offline(VK, x) = F
from X to G1, where the group elements (F1, F2, . . . , Fn) ∈ G n 1 are part of the keys. The VC schemes discussed above follow this format.
MULTI-RELATION HASH & PROVE SCHEMES (HP)
We define our schemes for efficiently decidable relations R ∈ R λ , with R ⊂ UR × WR. Recall that we are interested in producing and verifying arguments that ∃w.R(u ; w) holds for pairs (u ; w) ∈ R, where u is the instance and w the witness. The witness can often speed up verification by providing a non-deterministic hint, as verification is often more efficient than computation, notably in the case of relations for NP complete languages. We keep the witness implicit when they can be efficiently computed from the instance. As in §2.1, we consider relations where UR splits into X, VR.
A multi-relation hash & prove scheme consists of 5 algorithms HP = (Setup, Hash, KeyGen, Prove, Verify), as follows.
pp ← Setup(1 λ ) takes the security parameter and generates the public parameter for the scheme; σx ← Hash(pp, x) produces a hash given some data x ∈ X; EKR, VKR ← KeyGen(pp, R) generates evaluation key EKR and verification key VKR given a relation R ∈ R λ ; ΠR ← Prove(EKR, x, v ; w) produces a proof of R(x, v ; w) given an instance and a witness that satisfy the relation.
b ← Verify(VKR, σx, v, ΠR) either accepts (b = 1) or rejects (b = 0) a proof of R given a hash of x and the rest of its instance v.
Note that hashes of inputs and the keys of a relation can be computed independently. In particular, σx can be computed 'offline', before generating keys, proving, or verifying instances of relations; and can be shared between all these operations.
Adaptive Soundness
We describe our intended security properties for an HP scheme, distinguishing two cases. We first define adaptive soundness with multiple relations and public verifiability, then describe a variant with a single relation. 
Adaptive Forgery Game
The designated-verifier variant of adaptive soundness is obtained by having KEYGEN return only EK, and giving A oracle access to VERIFY. The single-relation variant is obtained by requesting that the adversary calls KEYGEN once.
Informally, adaptive soundness means that an adversary that interacts with a verifier on any number of chosen instances of relations supported by HP cannot forge any argument. Although the VERIFY procedure in the experiment always recomputes σx, this hash can of course be shared between verifications of multiple instances that use the same x.
Unfolding the definition, the single-relation, public verifiability game is defined by Adaptive Forgery Game (single relation, public verifiability)
A wins if Verify(VK, Hash(pp, x), v, Π) = 1 and ¬∃w.R(x, v ; w)
This simpler, single-relation game is still adaptive, in the sense that the relation R can be chosen by A with knowledge of pp, and the instance x, v can depend on EK, VK. Using a standard hybrid argument, we confirm that adaptive singlerelation soundness implies adaptive soundness.
Theorem 3.1 (Security of multi-relation HP).
A HP scheme that is -secure as per Definition 3.1 for a single relation is q -secure for multiple relations, where q bounds the number of calls to KEYGEN made by the adversary.
Accepting Hashes from the Adversary
In the definition of adaptive soundness, all hash outputs need to be trusted: at some point, the verifier is given x and honestly computes its hash σx, or (equivalently) receives σx from a trusted party. However, there are cases where the verifier may be given σx but not x. As an example, a composite argument that there exists an intermediate x ∈ X such that f (z) = x and g(x) = r may consist of z, σx, r, Π f , Πg where Π f and Πg prove the two functional relations above. Passing an 'opaque' hash σx may be more efficient than passing x, and may enable the prover to keep x secret. Similarly, one may see σx as a binding commitment to some x, received from the adversary, then later used in arguments that disclose some of its contents. Definition 3.1 does not account for such arguments.
In order for HP to support arguments on hashes provided by the adversary, we further require that its Hash algorithm is an extractable collision-resistant hash function. The extractability property guarantees that σx was indeed produced by Hash on some input x. The collision-resistance property guarantees that it is hard to produce two inputs for which Hash produces the same output.
Definition 3.2 (Hash Extractability [11]). A hash function
Hash is extractable when, for any p.p.t. adversary A, there exists a p.p.t. extractor E such that, for a large enough security parameter λ and 'benign' auxiliary input aux ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) , the adversary wins the game below with negligible probability.
Hash Extraction Game
and there is a p.p.t. algorithm Check(pp, σ) that returns 1 if ∃x.Hash(pp, x) = σ and 0 otherwise.
(In the game above, (A E) indicates running both algorithms on the same inputs and random tape, and assigning their results to σ and to xe, respectively.) In contrast with the original definition of [11] , we require the existence of Check so that our verifiers can check the well-formedness of hashes received from the adversary.
Adaptive soundness for HP schemes guarantees collisionresistance for Hash as long as, for all x0 = x1, there exists a relation R ∈ R λ and v ∈ VR to separate them, that is, ∃w.R(x1, v; w) ∧ ¬∃w.R(x0, v; w). On the other hand, adaptive soundness does not guarantee that σ is unique, nor does it exclude adversaries able to forge σ that pass verification.
Complementarily, hash extraction enables us to verify arguments that include opaque hashes provided by the adversary by first extracting their content then applying adaptive soundness. To formalize this idea, we complete our definitions with a more generally useful notion of soundness, called adaptive hash soundness.
At a high level, an adaptively hash sound HP scheme allows us to verify a composite argument whose instances mix plaintext values x ∈ X and opaque hashes σ ∈ Σ, where Σ is a finite set of hashes; importantly, the same σ can occur in multiple instances. To verify the argument, the verifier checks each proof using hashes that are either recomputed from x ∈ X (once for each x, similar to Definition 3.1), or checked for well-formedness.
Our main result for this property is that any scheme HP that is both adaptively sound and hash extractable is also adaptively hash sound. This result relies on soundness of HP, provided that one has access to preimages of the hash values σ ∈ Σ; in turn, this requirement is guaranteed by the hash extractability property. See the full version for details.
Stronger Security Notions for HP Our security definitions for HP schemes model adaptive soundness and extractability of hash inputs, but not extractability of witnesses, i.e., an equivalent of knowledge soundness for HP schemes. While adaptive soundness is sufficient for applications such as verifiable computation in which the input data is supplied by the verifier, knowledge soundness can be useful when using HP schemes in larger cryptographic protocols and in applications where the prover also provides some input. Elaborating such a definition of knowledge soundness for HP schemes (and proving a construction using it) raises subtleties related to defining an extractor for an adversary that has adaptive access to the KEYGEN oracle. We believe this is an interesting direction, which we leave for future work. Another useful security notion that may be considered is zero-knowledge, which intuitively guarantees that proofs do not reveal any non-trivial information about the witnesses. A zero-knowledge definition for HP schemes is provided in the full version of this paper.
Hash & Prove Scheme via Inner Encoding
In the introduction, we distinguished between two ways of embedding data representation inside VC schemes: inner and outer encodings. Here we describe a construction proposed in [11, 26, 5, 15] which serves as an example of inner encoding. We call this scheme HP inn . The construction is presented for completeness (to show that it formally ad-heres our new definitions), and to facilitate the comparison with our new constructions of §4.
The construction uses a keyed, collision-resistant hash scheme with domain X, consisting of two algorithms k ← keygen(1 λ ) and σ ← hash k (x), together with a succinct argument VC for a family of relations R , defined next.
Intuitively, we check the computation σ = hash k (x) within the proof system: to argue on a relation R in HP inn , our construction uses VC on a relation R :
Compared with R, the relation R uses σx instead of x in the instance, and takes x as an additional witness. (Presumably, σx is smaller than x and easier to process in proof verifications.) We define HP inn as follows:
and returns k as pp;
If VC is knowledge-sound and hash is collisionresistant, then HP inn is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations).
Hash Extractability. The above construction naturally extends to extractable hashes, by applying VC to the relation that checks the hash computation, defined by
We write HPE for the resulting scheme, obtained from HP inn above by extending the Setup and Hash algorithms and adding a Check algorithm:
σx ; x) and returns σ = (σx, Π). Check(pp, σ) parses σ as (σx, Π) and returns VC.Verify(VKpp, σx, v, Π).
If VC is knowledge-sound, then HPE is hash extractable (Definition 3.2).
The proof of Theorem 3.3 follows from the existence of the VC extractor. By using a separate VC scheme on a new relation R k , rather than re-using a VC scheme on one of the relations R , we can use knowledge soundness in a completely standard manner, taking only the key k as 'benign' auxiliary input.
Discussion. The HP inn construction is simple, and can be extended to Merkle trees [15] to provide logarithmic random access in data structures. Its main practical drawback is that the relation to be verified now includes a hash computation, which adds tens of thousands of cryptographic operations to the prover's workload for each block of input when using standard algorithms such as SHA2 ( §6). To lower this considerable cost for the prover, one pragmatically chooses custom, algebraic hash functions, which in turn increases the cost for the verifier that computes the digest. In the following sections we present constructions that are efficient for both the prover and the verifier.
HASH & PROVE CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section we present our main technical contribution: two efficient multi-relation hash & prove schemes for families of relations R λ . We let R(x, v ; w) range over these relations.
Our two schemes are obtained via a generic hash & prove construction that relies on two main building blocks: (i) any SNARK scheme that has offline/online verification algorithms (cf. §2.1) and where the offline verification consists of a multi-exponentiation in a group G1; (ii) any HP scheme that allows to prove the correctness of such multiexponentiations.
Before presenting our generic construction in full detail, we provide some intuition. We start from the observation that in offline/online SNARKs the verifier already computes an element cx = i Fi x i . Although cx can be seen as a hash of the input x, such hash is relation-specific because the elements Fi depend on the relation R that was used in the SNARK's KeyGen. Our main idea is to outsource the computation of cx to the prover in order to obtain an HP scheme where x can be hashed in a relation-independent manner. Then, we ask the prover to show the correctness of cx using an HP scheme (where hashes are indeed relation-independent) that supports relations of the form (x, cx) : cx = i Fi x i . Building an HP scheme from another HP scheme may look silly at first, however the key point is that we require an HP that supports a specific class of relations: only multiexponentiations. Conversely, our method can be seen as a way to bootstrap, via SNARKs, an HP scheme that supports one specific class of computations into another one that can support arbitrary computations.
Following the generic HP construction from a hash & prove scheme for multi-exponentiation, we propose new constructions to instantiate the latter. The first, called XP1, is publicly verifiable, whereas the second one, called XP2, is in the designated verifier model but enjoys better efficiency. The two new schemes are significantly more efficient than what could be obtained using known techniques (e.g., the construction based on inner encoding in §3.3).
As a result, the instantiation of our generic construction with state-of-the-art SNARKs and our new HP for multiexponentiation yields an HP system that, compared to the solution in §3.3, is at least 1, 400× times faster for the prover and the key generator (cf. §6).
The rest of the section is organized as follows. In §4.1 we describe the generic construction; in §4.2 we give our publicly verifiable HP scheme for multi-exponentiation, and in §4.3 we give the designated verifier one. Finally, in §4.4 we outline additional properties of our constructions, including data updates and extension of HP to accumulators.
Generic Hash & Prove Scheme (HPgen)
Let VC = (KeyGen, Prove, Verify) be a SNARG scheme that supports a sequence of relations {R λ } λ and that has offline/online verification, as described in §2.1: we assume that every verification key VK of VC includes group elements F1, . . . , Fn ∈ G1 and that Offline(VK, x) = n i=1 Fi x i computes a commitment cx.
Let XP = (Setup, Hash, KeyGen, Prove, Verify) be an HP scheme that supports relations F ⊂ U ×∅ where u is Z n p ×G1, every F ∈ F is defined by a vector F = (F1, . . . , Fn) ∈ G n 1 , and a pair (
We use XP and VC to construct a scheme HPgen that supports any combination of relations R(x, v ; w) supported by VC. The only requirement is that both schemes have compatible (or identical) public parameters. Namely, they share the same bilinear group setting, and the number of inputs in x, n, should be the same as in XP.
HPgen is defined as follows: Hence, proofs ΠR in HPgen carry three representations of x: its portable hash σx; its offline relation-specific commitment cx; and a multi-exponentiation proof Φx that binds the two. Compared with VC proofs, and using our instantiations of XP described later in this section, the communication overhead for HPgen proofs is two group elements (or three if we want hash extractability).
The following theorem states the security of HPgen.
Theorem 4.1. If XP is adaptively sound in the publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting, and VC is sound, then the HPgen construction in §4.1 is adaptively sound in the publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting.
The idea is rather simple: any adversary which breaks HPgen has to either break the security of the underlying VC scheme, or cheat on the value of cx, thus breaking the security of XP. Our proof shows a reduction for each case.
We also give a corollary that essentially says that, by instantiating our generic construction with a hash extractable XP scheme, we can handle arguments with untrusted hashes. It follows by construction of HPgen, observing that this scheme uses the hashing algorithm of XP. 
Our Publicly Verifiable HP Scheme for Multi-Exponentiation (XP1)
We present our second key technical contribution: a hash & prove scheme, called XP1, for the class of multi-exponentiation relations F described above.
For clarity, we write Φ instead of Π for restricted proofs.
and returns pp = (G λ , H) where H = (H1, . . . , Hn). , (x1, . . . , xn) ) returns σx ← i∈ [1,n] ; and returns EKF = (F, T, R) and VKF = (U, V, W ) where R = (R1, . . . , Rn) and T = (T1, . . . , Tn). , (x1, . . . , xn) , cx) computes Tx ← i∈ [1,n] Ti x i and Rx ← i∈[1,n] Ri x i ; and returns Φx = (Tx, Rx).
Hash(pp

Prove(EKF
(Implicitly we require that cx = i∈[1,n] Fi x i , though the cx part of the instance is not used in the computation of the proof.) Verify(VKF , σx, cx, Φx) parses Φx = (Tx, Rx) and returns e(Tx, g2) ? = e(σx, U ) e(Rx, V ) e(cx, W ).
The following theorem states that XP1 scheme is secure. Correctness follows by inspection. Proof Outline. The proof works by considering the case of a single relation as the extension to multiple relations is obtained by applying Theorem 3.1.
Below we provide the outline of the security proof via a sequence of game hops.
Game 0: this is the adaptive soundness game of Definition 3.1 restricted to a single relation. We claim that Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable. The intuition is that δ is information theoretically hidden from the adversary, which implies that the only event which changes the game's outcome happens with negligible probability. This game is essentially changing the distribution of the evaluation keys returned to the adversary. The distribution in this game however is computationally indistinguishable from the one in Game 1 under the Strong External DDH (SXDH) assumption. Finally, once accounted for this game difference it is possible to show that any p.p.t. adversary has negligible probability of winning in Game 2, under the Flexible co-CDH assumption (which in turn reduces to SXDH).
Detailed proofs for the indistinguishability of the three games as well as a reduction from winning in Game 2 to breaking Flexible co-CDH are in the full version.
We can make the XP1 construction hash extractable by adding a knowledge component. The resulting scheme, XPE , consists of algorithms KeyGen and Prove from XP1 together with the following additional algorithms. Proof. The existence of an extractor for the Bilinear n-Knowledge of Exponent Assumption implies the existence of an extractor for the XPE construction.
Our Designated Verifier HP Scheme for Multi-Exponentiation (XP2)
We present another hash & prove scheme for multi-exponentiation, called XP2, which works in the designated verifier setting. XP2 works similarly to XP1 but has the advantage of requiring one less element in the proof and one less multiexponentiation for the prover.
The XP2 scheme works for the same class of relations F supported by XP1, and the construction is obtained by adapting a multi-function verifiable computation scheme by Fiore and Gennaro [23] , which works for a similar restricted class of functions, (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ Z n p . In the full version we define XP2 more generically based on homomorphic weak pseudorandom functions [23] . For simplicity, we describe below the instantiation of the scheme based on the SXDH assumption.
The scheme XP2 works as follows:
and returns pp = (G λ , H) where H = (H1, . . . , Hn).
where T = (T1, . . . , Tn).
Prove(EKF , (x1, . . . , xn), cx) computes Φx ← i∈ [1,n] Ti
and returns Φx. (Implicitly we require that cx = i∈[1,n] Fi x i , though the cx part of the instance is not used in the computation of the proof.)
Verify(VKF , σx, cx, Φx) returns Φx
Theorem 4.3 (Adaptive Soundness of XP2).
If the SXDH assumption holds in G1, then the XP2 construction above is adaptively sound (Definition 3.1 for multiple relations and a designated verifier).
We outline the intuition behind the proof of the Theorem. The values (H k i )i are pseudorandom (by SXDH), and thus so are (Ti)i. After making a hybrid step where their distribution is changed to random, the value of δ becomes information-theoretically hidden from the adversary, making its probability of cheating negligible.
A publicly verifiable variant in the generic group. Interestingly, the above scheme can be modified to become publicly verifiable as follows: we publish (g δ 2 , g k 2 ) as part of VKF , and use these elements with a pairing in the verification algorithm. The resulting scheme has the advantage of being more efficient than XP1. As a drawback, we can only argue its security in the generic group model, and leave this analysis for the full version of this work.
Hash Extractability. We note that we can make the construction XP2 hash extractable by incorporating a knowledge component, in the same way as we show for XP1.
Additional Properties of Our Instantiation
By plugging XP1 (or XP2) into the generic HPgen construction of §4.1 we obtain an efficient HP scheme that can handle any relation supported by the underlying SNARK system.
A useful property of the hash function of both our constructions XP1 and XP2 is its (additive) homomorphism, i.e., Hash(x1) · Hash(x2) = Hash(x1 + x2). This property turns out to have several applications, which we summarize below.
Incremental hashing for data streaming applications. The hash of our construction can be computed incrementally as σi ← σi−1 · H
(with σ0 = 1). This is particularly useful in applications where a resource-constrained device outsources a data stream x1, x2, . . . to a remote server while keeping locally only a small digest σi computed as above. Later, at any point, the client will be able to verify a computation on the stream x1, . . . , xi by only using σi. Furthermore, when hash extractability is not needed, the XP1 construction can be modified by letting Hi = RO(i) where RO is a hash function that in the security proof is modeled as a random oracle (we omit a proof for this case which is straightforward: simply simulate RO(i) as the Hi in the current proof). This simple trick allows for constant-size public parameters and, more interestingly, to work with a potentially unbounded input size n-a feature particularly useful in streaming scenarios.
Efficient hash updates. Another application of the homomorphic property is efficient hash updates. Given a hash σx = i Hi x i on a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn), one can easily update the i-th location from xi to x i . Instead of recomputing the hash from scratch (which would require work linear in n), one simply does a constant-time computation σ x = σx · Hi x i −x i . This trick also generalizes to updating multiple locations in time linear only in the number of locations that require an update.
Multiple data sources. The homomorphic property also implies that the hash can be computed in a distributed manner. For instance, one user computes σ x,k = i∈ [1,k] i , and then a verifier who receives σ x,k and σ x, can reconstruct the full digest on (x1, . . . , x ) with a single multiplication. This feature is useful in those applications where the data is provided by multiple trusted sources, in which case only small digests have to be communicated. (For example, consider training a machine learning model using different datasets.)
Randomizing hash values. If one of the xi inputs of the hash is uniformly random in Zp, then the output of Hash(pp, x) is a uniformly random element in G1. Showing that SNARK systems randomized in this fashion do not leak anything about their hashed data is less trivial as the same randomness is reused by σx and the cx values of different relations. This is akin to randomness reuse in ElGamal encryption, which is permissible. However, in most SNARK systems the group elements used for commitment randomization have structure, precluding a straightforward reduction to DDH. A detailed analysis of a multi-relation zero-knowledge property for specific VC schemes is thus an interesting open problem.
From hashes to accumulators. Accumulators are often used as succinct representations of sets that enable fast, limited, verifiable processing. For example, one can efficiently prove and verify arguments on set operations by exploiting the structure of accumulators [38] , with better performance than by relying on a general-purpose VC scheme. To this end, we offer schemes that allow one to transition between proof systems that operate on hashes and accumulators. In particular, we introduce Accumulate & Prove scheme which is a variant of HP that operates on accumulators and builds on HP and XP (to verify that the hash and the accumulator were computed from same data). See the full version.
OUTSOURCING HASH COMPUTATIONS
In our efficient HP constructions of §4, the Hash algorithm computes a succinct digest σx using one exponentiation for every element of x. Hence, when using instantiations with XP1 or XP2, an HPgen verifier that wishes to relate computations verified using σx to their actual inputs x must still perform |x| exponentiations, or trust some data provider that associates σx to x. Though the same σx could be used to verify many computations that involve x, thereby amortizing the cost of hash computation, we are looking to further optimize this cost.
In this section, complementarily, we describe a technique to outsource hash computations to an untrusted party such that the verifier (or its trusted data provider) only needs to perform |x| field multiplications and one efficient cryptographic hash on x, say SHA2, typically saving two orders of magnitude.
We present our construction, called HP * , as a generic extension of any HP system to which it adds support for verifiable outsourcing of hash computations. The main benefit of this extension is that the verifier does not need to run the Hash algorithm: instead, it can upload x to the untrusted prover; obtain its hash σx together with a proof of hashing Π h , verify them; and finally keep σx. Intuitively, the verifier can then use σx to refer to x as if it had computed it itself.
Definition
We define HP * as an extension of a given hash & prove scheme HP. In particular, the functionality of the trusted Hash algorithm is supplemented with a pair of new algorithms, HashProve and HashVerify, run respectively by the untrusted prover and by the verifier. HashProve computes a hash of data x and augments it with a proof that the hash is computed correctly (that is, it is computed according to Hash algorithm). HashVerify then accepts σx as the hash if the proof verifies correctly.
Formally, HP * is a multi-relation hash & prove scheme that supports hash outsourcing and consists of 7 algorithms HP * = (Setup, Hash, HashProve, HashVerify, KeyGen, Prove, Verify). We omit a description of Setup, Hash, KeyGen, Prove and Verify, as they are defined identically to those in HP ( §3). Π h ← HashProve(pp, x, σx) produces a proof of R Hash (x, σx) = (σx ? = Hash(pp, x)) given some data x ∈ X and hash σx; b h ← HashVerify(vp, x, σx, Π h ) either accepts (b h = 1) or rejects (b h = 0) a proof that σx is a hash of data x. In addition to being a Hash & Prove scheme (i.e., satisfying adaptive soundness or adaptive hash soundness), HP * must be secure with regards to outsourcing, as defined below.
Definition 5.1 (Sound Hash Outsourcing). Outsourcing of HP * hash computation is secure if every p.p.t. adversaries wins the game below only with negligible probability.
This game is similar to the Hash Extraction game, but it does not involve extraction, as the verifier is given both x and σ * x . (The designated-verifiability variant is obtained by keeping vp private and, instead, giving the adversary oracle access to HashVerify.)
Hash outsourcing ensures that, when verifying composite arguments as in adaptive hash sound schemes (cf. §3.2), one can safely replace calls to Hash with calls to HashVerify. In particular, with HP * , an argument can be passed to a relation either as data x, as a hash σ or as (x, σ * ). Our definition can be trivially satisfied by ignoring Π h and setting HashVerify(pp, x, σ, Π h ) = (σ ? = Hash(pp, x)) but of course we are looking for more efficient constructions.
Efficient Construction (HP * )
We build HP * out of any hash & prove scheme HP, and two additional tools: an almost universal hash function h (recalled below) and a regular hash function H (that will be modeled as a random oracle).
Almost Universal Hash Functions. An -almost universal hash function h is such that, for all x = x chosen before h is sampled, we have Pr
We will use such functions from Z n p to Zp, instantiated by hα(x) = n i=1 xiα i−1 and keyed with a random α ∈ Zp. These functions can be computed as hα(x) = x1 + α(x2 + . . . α(xn−1 + αxn))) using n additions and n − 1 multiplications by α, which is particularly efficient in verifiablecomputation schemes for arithmetic circuits.
Lemma 5.1. hα is (n − 1)/p-almost universal.
Proof. Expanding the collision equality, we get
we have a non-zero polynomial in α of degree at most n−1, with at most n − 1 roots, so this equality holds with probability at most (n − 1)/p.
Before delving into the details of the construction, let us describe its main ideas. The first idea is to build HP * by extending any HP with algorithms HashProve and HashVerify that allow to prove and verify the correctness of σx ? = Hash(x). Notably, HashVerify must be significantly faster than recomputing Hash(x). To this end, our second idea is to let HashProve compute a (freshly sampled) universal hash function hα(x) and generate a proof Π h that links hα(x) to the correct σx. Then our HashVerify simply checks Π h (in constant time) and recomputes the universal hash hα(x), which is much faster than the multi-exponentiation Hash. The security of universal hash functions relies on their input being chosen before hα is sampled. To this end, we require that hα depend on the input x by setting α = H(x, σx) where H is a hash function.
We are now ready to give our HP * construction. Let R h be the relation defined by R h (x, α, µ) = (µ ? = hα(x)), and let H be a hash function. We build HP * using any HP that supports relation R h and is hash-extractable.
Setup(1 λ ) runs setup and generates keys for outsourcing h:
HashProve(pp, x, σx) computes α = H(x, σx); µ = hα(x); Π h ← HP.Prove(EK h , x, (α, µ)) and returns Π h ;
HashVerify(vp, x, σx, Π h ) computes α = H(x, σx); µ = hα(x) and checks HP.Verify(VK h , σx, (α, µ), Π h ).
We omit Hash, KeyGen, Prove and Verify algorithms as they are simply calls to their counterparts in the HP scheme (for example, HP * .KeyGen calls HP.KeyGen(pp , R)). We stress that, even if asymptotically our new construction is not better than the original one (the verifier performs Θ(n) operations), in practice, the operations performed by the verifier in HP * .HashVerify are orders of magnitude faster than those in HP.Hash.
Discussion. Applying HP * to our efficient constructions of §4 (either public or designated verifier), our proofs now carry a fourth representation µ = hα(x) of x in addition to its hash σx, its commitment cx, and a proof Φx. Note that we rely on extraction only for the witnesses x of the fixed relation R h .
To avoid random oracles, we can use an interactive, designated verifier variant of HP * , whereby (1) the prover commits to x and σx; (2) the verifier sends a fresh random α; (3) the prover produces a proof of R h ; (4) the verifier checks the proof against x and σx, as above.
Security. We finally state the security of hash outsourcing:
Theorem 5.1. In the random oracle model for H, if hα is an -almost universal hash function, HP is adaptively sound and hash extractable in publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting, then HP * is sound for outsourcing of hash computations as per Definition 5.1 in publicly verifiable (resp. designated verifier) setting.
We note that all HP constructions in §4 can be made hash extractable (meeting requirements of Theorem 5.1) and can be used for secure hash outsourcing.
EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze and measure the performance of our new HP constructions compared to previous solutions.
Our evaluation is twofold. First we analyze the efficiency of our scheme HPgen from §4 (instantiated with Geppetto [19] and XP1) and we compare it against the inner encoding construction HP inn of §3.3 (also instantiated with Geppetto and various choices of the hash function). Second, we report on the impact of our hash outsourcing technique of §5 in speeding up hashing and verification time.
Microbenchmarks
We performed a series of microbenchmarks on a single core of a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2620 with 32 GB of RAM. The table below gives the time for individual operations on the fields and elliptic curves used by Geppetto. The cost of multi-exponentiation and for SHA-256 is reported for each 254-bit word of input. 
Inner vs. Outer Encodings
We compare the asymptotic performance of inner and outer encodings and summarize the results in Figure 1 .
In our evaluation, we make a distinction between different types of verifier effort, depending on whether the verifier's input to the computation is passed by value or by reference via a hash (referred to as an opaque hash for HP schemes in §3.2). In the figure, they are denoted as "Verify IO" and "Verify Intermediate Commitments", respectively.
When the verifier's input is passed by value, she (or someone she trusts) must directly handle each IO value, so the cost depends on the size, n, of the IO. Note that for any particular verifier, such computation is required only once for a given IO value, as the computed commitment (or hash) can be reused in subsequent computations.
When a verifier uses IO values passed by reference, she verifies a proof using a commitment or hash of the IO values without handling them directly. Since the commitment/hash values are constant size, the verification effort is also constant. A verifier may use IO values passed by reference when the corresponding hash comes from a trusted source (e.g., the verifier herself), or when it represents intermediate values in a computation (e.g., between mappers and reducers in a MapReduce computation) where the verifier merely needs to check the consistency of the IO, rather than the values themselves.
HP inn . We consider the construction HP inn given in §3.3 instantiated with Geppetto and either SHA-1, SHA-256, or Ajtai's [1] hash function. On the positive side, HP inn has the same number of elements in the proof as Geppetto; its online verification cost is the same as in Geppetto, while offline verification consists of one hash computation plus a multiexponentiation on a fixed size word. On the negative side, to support a relation R, HP inn forces Geppetto to work with a relation R which (on top of encoding R) encodes hash computations. The latter adds significantly to the evaluation key size and the prover's work, which scale linearly Figure 1 : Asymptotic Performance. Comparison of our schemes and prior work. For our schemes, we assume the use of our publicly verifiable XP 1 scheme, and HP * is instantiated with HPgen. We use n for the size of the inputs/outputs (IO), d n for the degree of the QAP used for the outsourced computation, and D = d + 350n. MultiExp is the cost of a multiexponentiation, and MulAdd is the cost of a simple field multiplication and addition. Ajtai(x) and SHA(x) is the time needed to compute an Ajtai (resp. SHA-256) hash on x words of input, and UHash(x) is O(x log x), i.e., the time necessary to compute and prove correct a universal hash.
and quasilinearly respectively in the number of quadratic equations needed to represent the computation. Concretely, Geppetto includes libraries for verifiably computing SHA-1 and SHA-256 hashes. For each 254-bit I/O element, these libraries require approximately 22,400 equations for SHA-1 or 35,000 for SHA-256. Similar libraries for Ajtai require only 300-400 equations per word of input, but they increase the cost for the verifier and may not suffice for privacy applications that require stronger randomness properties from the hash function [15] .
Geppetto. Geppetto is an example of an outer encoding scheme which avoids the expenses incurred by inner encodings. For example, compared with the hundreds or thousands of equations used for inner encodings, Geppetto only adds one equation per word of input, and hence they report improving prover performance by two orders of magnitude for processing I/Os [19] . However, Geppetto's approach requires the verifier to compute commitments using a multiexponentiation (versus a hash in HP inn ) that is linear in the I/O size. Furthermore, Geppetto must specify which computations will be supported at setup time, before data is selected for said computations.
Our HPgen Scheme. Unlike Geppetto, which fixes at setup which computations will be supported for committed data, our HPgen scheme offers full generality; i.e., data can be hashed completely independently of the computations to be performed, and indeed, new and fully general computations can be verified over previously hashed data.
HPgen's new generality comes at a modest computational cost relative to Geppetto. In terms of communication, HPgen proofs include two more elements (three with hash extractability); the evaluation key and the verification key of every relation contain, respectively, 2n and 3 extra elements. In terms of computation, our prover has to perform two additional n-way multi-exponentiations. The verifier's online cost is the same as in Geppetto, whereas offline verification requires one hash computation (i.e., one n-multiexponentiation) plus four pairings. If we wish to support hash extractability, then this adds an additional group element to the proof, an additional multi-exponentiation for the prover, and an additional pairing for the verifier. Overall, the additional burden (linear in the I/O size n) that HPgen adds relative to Geppetto is quite small, since both the size of the evaluation key and the prover's effort are typically dominated by the complexity of the outsourced computation, which, in most applications, is much larger than n.
Compared with inner encodings like HP inn , however, HPgen saves the prover significant effort. Concretely, if we instantiate HP inn with Ajtai's hash, then HPgen is 1, 400× faster per I/O word (e.g., for n = 1, 000, HP inn takes 10 minutes while HPgen takes half a second), while for SHA-256, the difference is closer to 140, 000× (e.g., HP inn takes 18 hours).
Our HP * Scheme: Outsourcing Hash Computations. Compared with HPgen, HP * drastically improves the verifier's I/O processing time. For the verifier, whereas HPgen required a multi-exponentiation linear in the I/O, with HP * , the linear costs consist of (1) a symmetric, fast SHA-256 hash computation to compute the key α; and (2) for each word, n additions and n−1 multiplications over Zp. A conservative comparison based on the results from §6.1 shows that (2) is 654× cheaper per I/O word than a multi-exponentiation, and that (1) using SHA-256 is even cheaper than (2) . Overall, compared with its current I/O processing, HP * thus reduces the linear costs of the Geppetto verifier by two orders of magnitude. As a concrete example, with n = 1, 000, 000, HPgen takes 4 minutes to process the I/O, while HP * needs half a second. Compared with Pantry, (2) takes one multiplication per word, which is also significantly cheaper than computing Ajtai's algebraic hash function on each word. An additional benefit of HP * is that the verifier's key becomes constant size (a few group elements for encoding α and µ) rather than linear in n.
These benefits come at a low cost: HP * increases the size of the proof from 11 to 20 elements. For the prover, the proof cost increases by just 2n field operations and a SHA-256 hash computation, plus the cost of generating Π h , which only depends on n and is independent of the overall relation to be proven.
Application Performance
To evaluate the impact of our schemes at the application level, we evaluated them on two applications.
Statistics has a data generator commit to n 64-bit words. Later, clients can outsource various statistical calculations on that data; for example, we experiment with computing K-bucket histograms.
DNA matching creates a commitment to a string of n nucleotides, against which a client can then outsource queries, such as looking for a match for a length K substring.
The performance results for both applications appear in Figure 2 . As expected, IO verification in HP inn is more efficient compared to the outer encodings schemes. Among outer encodings, our HP * outperforms others as the size of the input grows and n multi-exponentiations start dominating the cost of verifying hash outsourcing in HP * . On the other hand, the outer encodings schemes are more proverfriendly. In particular, the prover's total effort (IO plus computation) is 1.02-2.3x higher for HP inn than for HP * (note that even though our schemes significantly reduce the prover's burden for IO, they do not affect the effort for the computation itself, and hence Amdahl's law limits the overall impact). Finally, the results for HP * show that the additional computation the scheme imposes on the prover pays off: verification is 18-150x more efficient than for HPgen with at most a 30% increase in the prover's efforts.
RELATED WORK
Cryptographic proof systems come in a variety of shapes, with inherent trade-offs between the efficiency of their provers and verifiers and the expressiveness of the statements being proven. One particularly interesting point in the design space are computationally-sound non-interactive proof systems, also known as argument systems [14] , that can be verified faster than by directly checking NP witnesses. Starting with the work of Micali [36] , there has been much progress [11, 30, 6, 26, 20, 31] leading to succinct noninteractive argument systems often referred to as SNARKs or SNARGs, depending on whether they establish knowledge rather than just existence of the NP witness. Significant theoretical improvements have been complemented with nearlypractical general-purpose implementations [40, 7, 19, 9, 47] .
As noted in §1 and §3.3, some prior work fits our hash & prove model with data verification embedded via inner and outer encodings. Here we review other solutions that follow the outer encoding approach.
In commit & prove schemes [33, 16] , one can create a commitment to the data, and use it in multiple proofs. Costello et al. [19] and implicitly Lipmaa [35] use this idea for verifiable computation to efficiently share data between proofs. However, in this approach all computations have to be fixed before one creates commitments to data. In other words, one has to know a-priori which computations will be executed on the data, which may not be the case in applications like MapReduce. This issue can be mitigated by fixing a universal relation, i.e., a relation which contains all relations that can be executed within a fixed time bound. However, this generality comes at a performance cost.
Several works by Ben-Sasson et al. investigate how to efficiently build universal relations for predicates described as random-access machine algorithms [5, 7, 9] . For instance, they describe a SNARK scheme [9] supporting boundedlength executions on a universal von Neumann RISC machine with support for data dependent memory access, but this generality comes at a cost [19] . To achieve full generality, the bound on the execution length can be removed via proof bootstrapping [46] . Despite recent improvements and innovation [8] , such bootstrapping is costly.
Memory delegation [18] also models a scenario where one outsources memory and only later chooses computations (including updates) to be executed on it in a verifiable way. In this model, after a preprocessing phase whose cost is linear in the memory size, the verifier's work in the online verification phase is sublinear in the memory size. In contrast, with HP schemes the verifier also needs to do linear work once to hash the input, but then the verification cost is constant with respect to the the input size.
Another possibility to address computation on previously outsourced data is to use homomorphic message authenticators [4] or signatures [17, 29] . With the former, data is flexibly authenticated when uploaded and then multiple functions can be executed and proved on it. Homomorphic authenticators share the limitation of commit & prove schemes: the class of computations has to be fixed before the data can be authenticated. Moreover, homomorphic authenticator constructions that offer more practical efficiency [4] work only for quite restricted classes of computations (low degree polynomials). The approach based on leveled homomorphic signatures [29] is more expressive but still very expensive in practice, as the size of the proof (i.e., evaluated signature) is polynomial in the depth of the computation's circuit.
AD-SNARKs [3] provide a functionality similar to homomorphic authenticators, working efficiently for arbitrary computations, but even in their case the set of computations has to be fixed a priori. As a further restriction, the model of both homomorphic authenticators and AD-SNARKs requires a secret key for data outsourcing, and it only supports append-only data uploading (i.e., it does not support changing the uploaded data). In contrast, the hash & prove model considered by this work supports delegating computation on public data, since hashes are publicly computable.
Finally, TRUESET [34] uses a Merkle hash tree over I/O commitments in a VC scheme to support computations on a subset of committed inputs (namely, a collection of sets). While this adds flexibility as to which inputs can be used in the computation, these inputs still have to be fixed a-priori.
